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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC IMPACT

Congress recently enacted the Trade and Tariff Act of 19841
which renews the United States Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) until 1993 and significantly changes the program's
operation. Generally defined, the GSP 2 applies zero tariffs against

1. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948. The renewal of the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) appears as Title V of the 1984 Act. Id. at 3018-24.

2. For additional articles explaining GSP, see Note, The Generalized System
of Preferences:Nations More Favored than Most, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 783
(1976) (explores the reasons for the enactment of the United States GSP, notes
strengths and weaknesses of the program, and speculates on the GSP's impact
on the United States, the BDCs and the international trading community); see
also de Bouter, Tariff Preferences Revisited, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 353 (1976)
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certain products from eligible beneficiary countries to promote
their trade and industrial development through increased access
to markets of donor countries. The duty-free status accorded
products from beneficiary countries theoretically supplies cost advantages that enable goods to sell in donor country markets at
competitive prices. In 1982 total United States GSP imports
amounted to $8.4 billion. In 1983 the total amount rose to $10.8
billion.Changes in the 1984 Act are intended to promote a more equi-

table distribution of GSP benefits among the eligible Beneficiary
Developing Countries (BDCs)4 and to target increased benefits to
the Least Less Developing Countries (LLDCs). 5 Despite the use

(generally evaluates the legal implications of a scheme of preferential tariffs
upon the GATT Most Favored Nation principle); McCulloch, Gains to Latin
America from Trade Liberalizationin Developed and Developing Nations, 21
Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 231 (1981) (explains how the GSP scheme is one of three
key developments having great effect on Latin American growth and development, and places the GSP in the larger context of other factors affecting trade
between developing and developed countries); Cutler, The United States Generalized System of Preferences: The Problem of Substantial Transformation, 5
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393 (1980) (discusses the rules of origin requirements including the value added criteria under the United States GSP and details Customs rulings and Customs and Treasury Department decisions with regard to compliance); Note, The Renewal of the United States Generalized
System of Preferences: A Legal and Economic Evaluation of the System and
Proposals for Change, 17 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 365 (1983) (evaluates
proposals for reforming the GSP considered when the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act
was passed, presents a legal and economic analysis of the GSP as it operates,
and suggests that the dual policy objective of promoting LDC development and
protecting United States domestic producers has resulted in a disjointed and
weak incentive scheme).
3. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, RENEwAL OF THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES, S. REP. No. 485, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
S. REP. No. 485].
4. Beneficiary Developing Countries (BDCs) are countries eligible to receive
zero tariffs on specified goods under the GSP. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of how BDCs are selected. Table I of the Appendix
lists those countries that qualify as BDCs in the United States GSP.
5. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES RENEWAL ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5101 [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1090]. Least Less Developing Countries (LLDCs) refers to the category
of nations recognized by the United Nations as the most deprived economic
group relative to other nations, based upon such criteria as per capita GNP. See
Table 2 in the Appendix for a list of LLDCs.
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of Competitive Need Limits (CNLs) 6 and principles of "graduation,' the seven leading BDCs (Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong,
Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, and Israel) account for nearly seventyfive percent of total GSP imports.8 Congressional recognition of
the inequitable distribution of GSP-stimulated trade and development among BDCs is reflected in the 1984 Act by attempts to
modify the program and to reallocate GSP benefits.
This disparate distribution of GSP benefits was the primary
factor that spurred Congress into making the 1984 changes. However, two other factors were also important: (1) the recent economic and trade success of the leading BDCs; and (2) recurrent
United States trade imbalances. These factors hardened congressional sentiments toward aid programs in general and led to a desire to limit GSP benefits to LLDCs. The United States trade
deficit for 1984 was a record $123.3 billion.' In July 1985, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige estimated that the United
States merchandise trade deficit would reach $140 to $150 billion
by the end of the year. 10 In marked contrast to United States
trade imbalances, Taiwan posted a record overall trade surplus of
$8.5 billion for 1984 and enjoyed a $9.8 billion surplus in trade
with the United States. 1 Taiwan shipped 48.8% of its total exports to the United States market. Taiwan's exports increased
sixteen percent in January 1985, resulting in a record one-month

6. The term Competitive Need Limits (CNLs) refers to methods whereby
specific products exported by certain BDCs are excluded from GSP treatment
for at least a year on the basis of economic factors that demonstrate a BDC's
"competitiveness" and loss of preferential need. See infra text accompanying
notes 99-117.
7. "Graduation" is the term used for the policy of denying further preferential access for specific products from certain BDCs, or for removing certain
countries from the list of BDCs, based upon a perception that economic factors
indicate an ability to compete in world markets without continued preferential
trading. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
8. H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5103. The other 25% of benefits are scattered among the numerous remaining eligible BDCs.
9. Auerbach, U.S. Trade Deficit Climbs in January to $10.3 Billion, Wash.
Post, Mar. 1, 1975, at 1A,col. 6.
10. Lawrence, Record $150 Billion Trade Deficit Likely, J. CoM., Jul. 1, 1985,
at 3A, col. 3.
11. Shapiro, Taiwan Posts Record Trade Surplus in '84, J. CoM., Mar. 11,
1985, at 22C, col. 1.
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trade surplus with the United States of $950 million.1 2 Similarly,
in 1984 Hong Kong exports to the United States were $7.8 billion,
an increase of forty percent above the 1983 level.13
The deteriorating economic and trade position of the United
States in relation to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and other socalled Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs)' 4 provoked Congress to qualify access to continuing trade opportunities under international incentive programs. A substantial part of the rationale
underlying congressional efforts to reform the GSP was a desire
to force the NICs to accept increased independence, economic responsibility and political maturity within the world trading system as an accompanyment to their increasing economic and trade
successes.
This Note outlines the purpose, scope and operation of the
GSP from 1976 until 1984. Both the initial authorizing legislation 5 and the 1984 Trade Act are analyzed. The 1979 modifications made in the Trade Agreement Act' 6 are briefly discussed
where they are relevant. The 1984 Trade Act changes are detailed, with commentary on the manner in which the renewed
GSP differs materially from prior law, and with discussion of the
underlying policies and significance of the changes. The Note concludes with comments on the diverse objectives of the United
States GSP scheme, its evolving nature, and prospects for continuation of the scheme beyond 1993.
A. Origins of the GSP Concept
Argentine economist Rdul Prebisch introduced the idea for a
Generalized System of Preferences at the first session of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
12. Bangsberg, Taiwan's Exports Jump 16 Percent in January,J. Com., Feb.
27, 1985, at 3B, col. 1.
13. Bangsberg, Hong Kong's Exports to Major Markets Showed Wide Gains
in 1984, J. CoM., Mar. 11, 1985, at 22C, col. 1.
14. Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) refers to nations that have sustained substantial industrial and economic growth in recent years and that
stand in the middle ground between the developed and less developed nations.
Examples of NICs include Mexico, Brazil, and Taiwan.
15. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
subsequently amended in 1979 at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1982)).
16. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (1982)). For a brief summary of this act, see A
PREFACE TO TRADE, infra note 18, at 13-17.
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(UNCTAD) in the early 1960s. 17 The concept of a GSP was

touted as a "logical extension of the infant industry argument."' s
By granting temporary duty-free entry for LDC exports into developed country markets, policymakers hoped that a GSP would
immediately increase the exports and purchasing power of LDCs
and would subsequently help LDCs diversify their economies and
infrastructure to produce manufactured and semimanufactured
export articles.19
Implementing a GSP in the United States required United
States policymakers to reverse completely their initial policy position toward the GSP idea.20 Upon Prebisch's introduction of the
GSP concept at UNCTAD, the United States initially opposed
the idea of preferential market access on four basic grounds.
First, the concept of preferential tariffs countered the GATT
Most Favored Nation (MFN) 21 principle of nondiscrimination,
which is the cornerstone of GATT multilateral accords. In the
early 1970s, policymakers feared that special tariff arrangements
might undermine the liberalization of world trade, which had
been advocated by the United States for more than twenty-five
17. See Nemmers & Rowland, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences:
Too Much System, Too Little Preference, LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 855, 855
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Nemmers & Rowland]; see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report by the Secretary-General, 2 Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1st
Sess.) 1, 5, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 46/141 (1964). For a more detailed discussion of
the GSP concept, see Comment, Preferential Treatment: A New Standard for
InternationalEconomic Relations, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 109, 113-16 (1977).
18. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 17,
at 35. Essentially, the infant industry argument calls for temporary protection
for an industry that has the potential to be competitive in the world market but
requires insulation from existing producers in its initial phase of production.
The theory recognizes that new industries realize declining costs as they expand
ovitput and acquire experience in production. See ExEc. OFFICE OF PRES. U.S.
TRADE REP., A PREFACE TO TRADE 141 (1982) [hereinafter cited as A PREFACE TO
TRADE].

19. See Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries: InternationalInnovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 Aid. J.
INT'L L. 513, 513 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Graham].
20. See generally id. at 514-20.
21. In general, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Most
Favored Nation (MFN) clause is a "commitment that a country will extend to
another country the lowest tariff rates it applies to any third country." A PmFACE TO TRADE, supra note 18, at 145. All GATT contracting parties agree to
apply MFN treatment under Article I of the GATT codes.
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years. 22 Second, the Kennedy Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN)2 3 were in progress at the same time the GSP legislation was being discussed. The United States did not want concerns about preserving the margins of preferential tariffs for
LDCs to hinder negotiations for what was considered a more important immediate objective-m-ultilateral reduction in tariff
levels. Third, the United States reasoned that if Kennedy Round
Tariff negotiations were successful in reducing tariff levels, the
economic basis for benefit under GSP programs would be diminished, perhaps to the point of negligible effectiveness for a GSP
scheme. 24 Finally, United States policymakers were generally suspicious of the policy initiatives emerging from UNCTAD, and
consequently harbored reservations about the quality of programs
initiated in that forum.2 5

22. See Graham, supra note 19, at 516.
23. The Kennedy Round was the sixth, and penultimate, round of seven
rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of GATT since 1947. This round
of trade negotiations occurred between 1963-67 and produced major reductions
in tariff rates, an antidumping code, and a now-abandoned wheat agreement.
See A PREFACE

TO

TRADE, supra note 18, at 143.

24. See generally Graham, supra note 19, at 516.
25. Personal interview with William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Representative,
Washington, D.C. (July 13, 1982) (Transcript of interview on file at Vanderbilt
Journal of TransnationalLaw) [hereinafter cited as Brock Interview]. (William
E. Brock headed the USTR until March 1985 when Clayton Yeutter was named
as his successor). Trade Ambassador Brock explained United States opinion:
[I]t is extremely difficult to be sympathetic to either UNCTAD or the UN.
It is just not possible to be sympathetic in trade terms because they don't
talk about trade. They talk about making political decisions that will affect trade in a negative fashion. And that's not responsible.
Id.
Insisting that the level of expertise is much higher in GATT, Brock continued:
[GATT's] the proper forum. It is expert talking to expert, and it involves
people with competence on the subject and really might achieve something very fundamental and very important to expand trading opportunities for the developing world ....

[In GATT] you have... trade officials

talking about a subject in which they know the subject matter. [In
UNCTAD] you have diplomatic or political representatives engaged in an
exercise in fairly classic demagoguery.
Id.
The political maneuvering in international negotiating contexts is reduced in a
forum like the GATT. Brock explained:
You have to have some sort of international mechanism; otherwise, politicians will do foolish things. If there are no safeguards against doing something stupid, then governments invariably will do the stupid things. They
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Subsequent international developments and substantial pressure from dependent allies caused the United States to modify its
original position on GSP and to support the concept based on
"political and psychological factors rather than economic criteria."' 26 In part, the United States changed its position on GSP as a

defensive response to special reverse preference trading relationships then being established between European Economic Community (EEC) countries and their former colonies, which had recently achieved independent status as nation-states.2 7 United
States opposition to the exclusive trading relationships and economic theories underlying reverse preference schemes indirectly
led to support for the GSP as a more acceptable multilateral form
of preferential trading. Political pressure asserted by the Latin
American countries on the United States to institute a "defensive" Western Hemisphere regional preference scheme particularly influenced the United States policy reversal. 28 The United

States reasoned that the emerging patterns of trade and special
regional trading relationships would threaten the free flow of
world goods and would harm the efficient allocation of resources
and competitiveness of goods. United States policymakers, therefore, embraced the GSP as a mechanism to halt the cartelization
of world trade.29
Thus, a unique GSP scheme, reflecting both international pollalmost are forced to by political pressure. The ultimate value of an inter-

national instrument such as the GATT... is that quite often the rules
will give a politician within a particular country an excuse not to do something that he knows he shouldn't do, but is under intense political pres-

sure to do.
Id.
26. Graham, supra note 19, at 517.
27. See id. at 516. The Yaound6 Convention originally established exclusive
reverse preference trade patterns between the EEC and fifty-three associated
states of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Yaound6 was later replaced by
the similar Lom6 Convention in 1975 without the reverse preferences scheme.
For a more detailed explanation of Yaound6 and reverse preference schemes, see
de Bouter, supra note 2, at 368 n.70; see also O.E.C.D. REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: REvEw OF THE FIRST
DECADE 40-41 (1983) [hereinafter cited as THE O.E.C.D. REPORT].

28. Graham, supra note 19, at 516 n.18. The pro-GSP views of the Latin
American countries were expressed in a letter from the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress.
29. President Johnson first announced United States support for the GSP
concept at the 1967 OAS meeting of the American Chiefs of State in Punte del
Este. See 56 DEP'T ST. BULL. 709 (1967).
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cymaking and domestic trade concerns, emerged in the United
States. United States policymakers considered the GSP important because it represented a political symbol of concern for the
problems of developing countries." The GSP also reflected the
congressional objective of encouraging LDC export earnings to
stimulate trade markets for United States exporters without injuring local producers.3 1 In addition, the GSP represented the following trade policymaking goals: (1) to base trade benefits upon
responsible actions within the international sphere; (2) to encourage LDC economic maturity with the expectation that LDCs
will adopt a more open trading posture; and (3) to promote freetrade principles and increase world trade and development. Acceptance of the GSP as part of domestic international trade policy removed the emphasis on bilateral aid and instead shifted the
focus to trade and market expansion as a primary mechanism to
assist international development-a policy popularly referred to
'32
as "trade rather than aid.

Preliminary multilateral negotiations toward implementation of
a GSP scheme took place within the GATT. Negotiations pitted
the donor nations from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)33 against the UNCTAD benefi30. Thomas R. Graham, former Deputy General Counsel for the Office of
U.S. Trade Representative, stated in the conclusion to his article on the development of the GSP scheme: "International trade, and more specifically import
competition, is the most politically visible and volatile component of international economic relations." Graham, supra note 19, at 540 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 524 n.43.
32. See id. at 513; see also R. NIXON, THE REAL WAR 36 (1980).
Ambassador Brock emphasized the beneficial aspects of the GSP program:
Remember, though, that GSP is essentially something that operates to the
advantage of Americans-not just our trading partners. What we are doing
is cutting prices on products that Americans want to buy. So, that's good
for American consumers; it's good for competition. I don't view the GSP as
something that's just a value for our trading partners. It's something of
value to us, too.
Brock Interview, supra note 24.
33. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
is headquartered in Paris and serves as the forum for the developed countries to
discuss trade and related matters. The OECD functions through various committees and working groups to conduct both studies and negotiations on particular problems which the developing countries must jointly resolve, and to coordinate policies for purposes of other international negotiations. The OECD
member countries consist of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
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ciary nations. Both sides, however, made significant compromises

34
to reach general agreement on the early form of the program.
With ideas from these multilateral negotiations, the respective
donor countries implemented their individual GSP schemes

through domestic legislation.
As the twenty-first donor country to offer a GSP scheme," the

United States implemented its GSP program as part of the 1974
Trade Act."' This initial GSP legislation was influenced by three
factors during the 1972-74 congressional years: domestic economic
and political affairs, recent foreign policy developments, and partisan politics. 3 7 The legislation reflected the amalgamation of
these trade policymaking factors, and hence, the GSP was a system born of sometimes disparate policy goals.
B.

Impact of GSP on Domestic Imports and Consumption

A recent International Trade Commission (ITC) study examined trends in GSP imports during the 1978-81 period in each
bourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. See A PREFACE TO
TRADE, supra note 18, at 147.
34. See generally Graham, supra note 19, at 517-20. Implementation plans
proceeded from general international forums to the level of domestic legislation.
Most donor countries announced programs in advance of the United States program. The United States GSP program was not implemented until January
1976. Id. at 533.
35. See OECD REPORT at 11.
36. See supra note 15.
37. For an explanation of how the USTR office developed a fragile constituency to support the GSP scheme, how and why many domestic concerns opposed the idea, and how concurrent foreign policy developments (e.g., the dollar
crisis of the early 1970s, the OPEC oil embargo, the Israeli-Arab problems,
growing concerns over terrorism, and problems with nationalization/expropriation of United States investments) influenced the final form of the program, see
Graham, supra note 19, at 520-26.
38. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 1379, AN EvALUATION OF U.S.
IMPORTS UNDER THE GENERALIZED

SYSTEM OF

PREFERENCES

(May 1983) [herein-

after cited as ITC PUB. No. 1379].
: I * [T]he purpose of the study is not to make a determination regarding
industry injury; rather, it is designed to give the Congress and the Executive Branch, as well as the public, a quantitative basis for their evaluation
of the impact of the GSP on important U.S. industries and to focus attention on those industries where various quantitative indicators show import
penetration which is worthy of note.
Id. at ii (emphasis in original).
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of the major industrial product sectors,3 9 providing impact analysis data in preparation for changes contemplated by the 1984 Act.
The ITC study compares levels and trends by using three ratios:
(1) GSP imports to total United States imports; (2) total United
States imports to total consumption; and (3) GSP imports to total consumption. 40 The ITC attempted to determine for each industry the extent to which GSP imports contributed to a "signifi'41
cant penetration of U.S. markets by imports.
ITC data indicate that GSP imports constitute a significant
amount of trade incentive without being overly burdensome to
domestic producers. GSP imports steadily increased in total dollar value at an annual rate of seventeen percent between 1978 and
1981, rising from $5.2 billion to $8.4 billion.4 2 The total dollar
amount of trade affected by the GSP is significant to the economies of the LDCs, but represents only a small percentage of overall United States import trade and consumption.
The ITC study concluded that during the last several years the
scope of GSP trade has been substantial enough to act as a development incentive, yet has not seriously harmed domestic producers. Supporting this conclusion are the ITC's three ratios expressed as percentages. First, GSP imported goods account for
less than five percent of total United States nonpetroleum imports.43 During 1978-81, GSP imports showed only a moderate
rise, from 4.1 to 4.9 percent.4 4 Second, the ratio of total United
States imports to total United States consumption averaged approximately ten percent during those years.4 5 Third, GSP imports
accounted for only 0.5 percent, or less, of total United States con-

39. The product sectors include agriculture, forest products, textiles, apparel,
footwear, chemicals, minerals/metals, machinery/equipment, and miscellaneous
manufactures. Id. at i.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at v. The report found significant increases in GSP import penetration in twelve different commodity/industry groups. Id. at vi.
43. Id. at v. During this time, however, changes in both country and product
eligibility could have significantly affected total-values.
44. Id. at v.
45. See id.
Regarding trade stimulation, the economic affect attributable solely to GSP
incentives is actually even less than five percent because many BDCs would import their goods into the United States at the higher MFN rates if GSP zero
rates were not offered. Id.
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sumption during 1978-81. 41
Six factors restrict the degree of market penetration by GSP
imports, and support the conclusion that "GSP imports have not
resulted in significant increases in the overall import share of the
U.S. market.' 7 First, GSP is restricted by product coverage.'8
Second, certain product categories are entirely exempt as "import-sensitive" from GSP. 49 Third, GSP incentive declines with
lowered MFN rates, because the spread in cost advantage narrows. 50 Fourth, Competitive Need Limits (CNLs), annual product
reviews, and graduation principles regulate GSP benefits and thus
temper BDC gains under the program." Fifth, the temporary nature of the program and the recent historical pattern of declining
52
MFN rates deters significant amounts of long-term investment.
Finally, many LDCs lack the essential infrastructure, capital, and
skilled labor necessary to utilize effectively manufacturing oppor53
tunities offered by the GSP.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATEs GSP IN OPERATION
A.

Statutory Authorization and Administrative Authority

Title V of the 1974 Trade Act 54 created the GSP scheme in the
United States. The 1974 Act set guidelines to determine country
and product eligibility based upon specific criteria established by
46. See id. at x, tab. 1.
47. Id. at vi.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see infra note 71 for an explanation of "import sensitive."
50. Id. By way of explanation, "the spread" between an MFN rate of 6%
and the GSP zero rate may not be significant enough to exploit economically.
The 1981 average MFN duty on GSP eligible items was slightly greater than 8%
ad valorem. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Producers of manufactured and semimanufactured articles in eligible
BDCs will be less likely to expand export operations and undergo added financial and structural commitments if they are unsure whether their product will
remain eligible for zero tariff treatment and if they ate unsure whether the
GATT MFN tariff rates for their products will remain significantly more than
the GSP zero rate.
53. Id. Without the ability to raise investment capital and without the necessary elements to support industrial production for export (e.g., electricity, roads,
skilled workers, transportation equipment, and dock facilities), a tariff incentive
can be useless.
54. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1982). The GSP was implemented by Exec.
Order No. 11,888, 40 Fed. Reg. 55,275 (1975).
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Congress as preconditions to GSP treatment. The Office of the
United States Trade Representative 5 (USTR) implements executive authority and makes discretionary decisions regarding GSP.
The USTR works through the Trade Policy Committee56 (TPC)
55. A USTR publication defines clearly the responsibilities of the Trade
Representative office:
The United States Trade Representative is a Cabinet-level official with
the rank of Ambassador who is the President's principal advisor on international trade and commodity policy. The primary international policy responsibilities include (1) expansion of U.S. exports; (2) matters concerning
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including implementation of agreements negotiated in the MTN; U.S. Government positions on trade and commodity matters dealing with multilateral organizations and the protection of U.S. rights under international trade and
commodity agreements; (3) to the extent permitted by law, overall U.S.
policy with regard to unfair trade practices, including enforcement of
countervailing measures and antidumping functions; (4) bilateral trade
and commodity issues, including East-West Trade matters; (5) international trade issues, involving energy; (6) direct investment matters to the
extent they are trade related; and (7) policy research on international
trade, commodity, and direct investment matters. USTR also has lead responsibility for conducting all international trade negotiations.
A PREFACE TO TRADE, supra note 18, at 159.
56. The Trade Policy Committee (TPC), the highest level trade policymaking group within the federal government, is the internal decisionmaking structure used by the USTR to develop trade policy. Trade Ambassador Clayton
Yeutter is the present chairman of the TPC, which is composed of secretaries of
the various cabinet level departments. Yeutter is also chairman of the smaller
Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC), consisting of secretaries from Commerce,
State, Treasury, Labor, and Agriculture. The TNC advises the President on all
specific trade matters. The Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) is the secondtier policymaking group consisting of representatives from the assistant secretarial level of agencies included in the higher TPC. The USTR office coordinates
the TPRG, which is chaired by the Deputy-USTR. The third tier of policymakers is the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) which consists of representatives from all the agencies on the TPC and an additional representative from
the International Trade Commission. The following explains the TPC decisionmaking structure:
The TPSC is the first-line operating group, with representation at the senior civil-servant level. Supporting the TPSC are 32 subcommittees responsible for specialized areas and several task forces that work on particular
issues. If agreement is not reached in the TPSC, or if particularly significant policy questions are being considered, issues are taken up by the
TPRG (Assistant-Secretary level). The TPC provides for Cabinet-level review to resolve agency disagreements. When Presidential trade policy decisions are needed, the Chairman of the TPC (the USTR) submits recommendations and advice ...

to the President.
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to make GSP recommendations to the President based on official
consultation with other executive agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Labor, as
57
well as the independent International Trade Commission (ITC).
The GSP Subcommittee of the TPC58 oversees the daily operations of the program, but directs consideration of politically sensitive matters or disagreements to higher TPC levels. 9 Generally,
however, GSP Subcommittee recommendations are rarely
overturned.60
B. Designation of Beneficiary Developing Countries
Currently 114 independent countries, twenty-six nonindependent countries and three trade associations participate in the
United States GSP scheme.6 1 The 1974 Trade Act gives the executive discretion to designate BDCs.6 2 Provisions of the 1974 Act,

however, enumerate general criteria the President must consider
63
when designating BDCs.

See A

PREFACE TO TRADE, supra note 18, at 78-79.
57. The ITC is an independent factfinding agency whose members and staff
make determinations of injury and recommendations for relief from increasing
export competition for industries or workers. At the request of the President or
Congress, or on its own initiative, the ITC may conduct comprehensive studies
of the possible economic effects to specific United States industries resulting
from proposed tariff cuts or reduced nontariff trade barriers. See A PREFACE TO
TRADE, supra note 18, at 158-59.
58. The GSP Subcommittee handles the daily administration of the GSP; it
is chaired by Deputy-USTR David Shark (formerly chaired by Tom St. Maxens). The Subcommittee plays the major role in administering the GSP program
and maintaining the GSP information center within the USTR. The information
center releases updates on GSP changes, prints annual GSP reports and maintains necessary data on all GSP operations.
The TPC structure, and the GSP Subcommittee, are important in light of the
changes called for in the 1984 Act because this structure will be used to implement the new standards and to apply the new criteria in future GSP
decisionmaking.
59. Interview with Tom St. Maxens, former Deputy Assistant Trade Representative for GSP, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as St.
Maxens Interview].
60. Id.
61. See A GUIDE TO GSP, infra note 66, at 3-4. See generally Table 1 of the
Appendix to this Note for a list of BDCs.
62. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1982) (implemented by Exec. Order No.
11,888, 40 Fed. Reg. 55,275 (1975)).
63. General criteria required by § 502(c) of the 1974 Act include:
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Furthermore, certain conditions can cause the denial or removal of a BDC from the list of eligible designees. For example,
BDC status is denied to the following countries: (1) Communist
countries, unless the products from the country receive nondiscriminatory treatment from the United States, the country is a
member of both the International Monetary Fund and the
GATT, and the country is not dominated by international Communism; (2) OPEC countries and other countries withholding
supplies of vital resources from the international market or disrupting the international market by their resource pricing policies; (3) countries granting preferential treatment to the products
of a developed country, other than the United States, where such
preferential treatment may substantially harm United States
commerce; (4) countries that have effectively nationalized or expropriated United States property, without entering into compensation negotiations under the International Convention for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes arbitration; (5) countries that
do not cooperate adequately with United States efforts to prevent
the importation of narcotics and other controlled substances into
the United States; (6) countries that fail to recognize or enforce
legitimate arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens, corporations, partnerships or associations; and (7) countries that aid
or abet terrorism by granting sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or terrorist group.6 4 The President may, in his discretion, waive application of factors (4) through (7), but only if the
President determines that granting BDC status will be "in the
national economic interest of the United States."6 "

(1) an expression by such country of its desire to be so designated;
(2) the level of economic development of such country, including its per
capita gross national product, the living standards of its inhabitants, and
any other economic factors which [the President] deems appropriate;
(3) whether or not the other major developed countries are extending
generalized preferential tariff treatment to such country; and
(4) the extent to which such country has assured the United States it
will provide equitable and reasonable access to the markets and basic commodity resources of such country.
Trade Act of 1974, 19 ,U.S.C. § 2462(c) (1982).
64. Id.
65. See id.
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Product Coverage and Designation of Eligible Articles

The United States GSP currently includes approximately 3,000
eligible articles designated by the five-digit classification scheme
for the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) 6 The list

of eligible articles primarily includes semimanufactured and manufactured goods.6 7 The President has authority to designate eligible articles upon advice of the USTR. Product coverage decisions
are made after consulting the ITC and other government agencies
concerning the likely impact that designation of eligible articles
will have on both the United States domestic market as well as
markets of BDCs6 s Developing countries uniformly request increased product coverage6 9 but often disagree on which specific
70
product sectors are crucial to fostering internal development.

66.

See ITC PUB.

No. 1379, supra note 38, at i; see also OFFICE OF THE U.S.

TRADE REP., ExEc. OFFICE OF PRES., A GUIDE TO THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF

PREFERENCES (GSP) (September 1984) (which also lists all GSP eligible articles
by the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) item number) [hereinafter
cited as A GUIDE TO GSP]. For an excellent explanation of the Tariff Schedule of
the United States, see Feller, Introduction to Tariff Classification,8 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 991 (1976).

As a result of the 1983 GSP product review, 22 new items were designated,
representing $7 million in newly-eligible trade (compared to $10 million added
in 1982). Thirteen petitions for product additions were denied-principally on
grounds of import sensitivity. See GSP INFORMATION CENTER, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REP., SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES

EFFECTIVE MARCH 30, 1984, 1 (1984).
67. See A GUIDE TO GSP, supra note 66, at i-ii. GSP product coverage includes the following general TSUS sectors: agriculture, forest products, textiles,
apparel, footwear, chemicals, minerals/metals, machinery/equipment, and miscellaneous manufactures. See ITC PUB. No. 1379, supra note 38, at i. Imports
within two product sectors, machinery/equipment and miscellaneous manufactures, together accounted for approximately one-half of all GSP imports during

1978-1981. Id. at x.
68. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST Fv YEARS' OPERATION OF THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES (GSP) 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 20-21 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter
cited as HOUSE REPORT ON FIRST FIVE YEARS' OPERATION OF THE GSP].

69. St. Maxens Interview, supra note 59.
70. There has been an ongoing debate over whether more agricultural products should be added to the GSP list. Proponents for adding more agricultural
items argue that this would benefit the LLDCs because of their natural competitiveness in this area. Others contend that this would be inconsistent with the
primary GSP goal of encouraging development in infant industries and would
also hurt American farmers. Opponents of adding more agricultural items to
GSP see no rationale for providing further incentive for LLDCs to perpetuate a
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Articles that are statutorily categorized as "import-sensitive"
because they are regarded as essential to national security, or articles that are discretionarily protected, may not be designated as
eligible for GSP treatment. 1 The original list of import sensitive
articles under section 503(c)(1) of the 1974 Trade Act contained
the following items: (1) textile and apparel articles subject to textile agreements; (2) watches; 2 (3) certain electronic articles; (4)
specific steel articles; (5) specific footwear articles; and (6) certain
types of semimanufactured and manufactured glass products.7 3
The President has general discretion to characterize other articles
as import-sensitive, thus removing them from GSP eligibility.7 4 In
addition to the import-sensitive exclusion, articles may not be
designated as GSP eligible if the President determines (1) that an
elimination or decrease in tariff duties would threaten national
security, 5 (2) that discretionary import relief should be granted

historical pattern of dependent trade.
71. See § 503(c)(1) of the 1974 Trade Act; 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(1) (1982). The
USTR generally defines import-sensitivity:
[This phrase]... in the context of the GSP implies that domestic injury
or threat of injury results, at least to a substantial degree, from the provision of duty-free treatment under the GSP.
Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 17, at 865.
The President's Five Year Review of the GSP states that "employment, production, capital investment, capacity utilization, and profits in the U.S. industry
are taken into account" when determining import-sensitivity. Other relevant
factors include "the level and growth of imports from developed and developing
countries, the extent to which the item traditionally has been excluded from
trade negotiations, and whether the U.S. industry has been injured by dumping." HousE REPORT ON FIRST FIV YEARS' OPERATION OF THE GSP, supra note
68, at 21.
72. But see Serko, Swaying the GSP, Am. IMiPORT EXPORT BULL. 4 (Aug.
1982) (explains how United States Customs classification decisions will greatly
affect GSP product coverage). Serko discusses Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United
States (C.C.P.A. Mar. 23, 1981) (CIT, slip. op. 81-31 (Apr. 17, 1981)). This case
presented the issue of whether assembled solid state electronic watches and
watch modules were timepieces excluded from GSP treatment under Customs
classification. Both the Court of International Trade and the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that because "watches" are described in tariff categories with respect to their movements, electronic digital
watches did not fall within the classification. Therefore, Hong Kong was entitled
to duty-free treatment under GSP for these timepieces.
73. 1974 Act § 503(c)(1); 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(1) (1982).
74. Id. § 503(c)(1)(G); 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(1)(G) (1982).
75. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982).
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to domestic producers, 6 or (3) that tariff adjustments should be
made pursuant to general tariff setting authority. 77
The GSP Subcommittee of the TPSC makes recommendations
to the President concerning product coverage.7 8 Annual product
coverage changes are made pursuant to a petition review process. 79 The USTR has promulgated regulations explaining the petitioning process to either add or subtract GSP eligible articles.8 0
Generally, any "interested party"8' may privately petition the
GSP Subcommittee for article changes. To qualify as an "interested party," the petitioner must have either a "significant economic interest in the subject matter of the request"8 2 or an interest that would be "materially affected" by the trade action
requested.8 3 The GSP Subcommittee may also initiate product
coverage changes without a specific request from an interested
4
8

party.

The petitioning party carries a substantial burden of proof to
demonstrate the merits of a requested product change.8 5 Each petitioner is responsible for providing a "detailed economic analy76.

See 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982). The President can grant general import re-

lief in the form of increased duties, tariff-rate quotas, quantitative restrictions
on imports and orderly marketing agreements.
77. See 19 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).

78. See

PREFACE TO TRADE,

supra note 18, at 79.

79. Id.
80. See 15 C.F.R. § 2007 (1985).
81. The following groups are invited to comment under the "interested parties" definition:
domestic or foreign manufacturers, importers, consumer groups, labor unions, domestic trade associations, or foreign governments, shippers and
trade associations . . . state or local government agencies in the U.S.
where, for example, such agencies were involved with regional or community development programs that were materially affected by the granting
or withholding of GSP benefits for one or more articles. ...
Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 17, at 861.
82. See 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(c) (1985).
83. Id.
84. See 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0(e) (1985). The GSP Subcommittee is nonpartisan
in its consideration of the many different product change petitions brought by
interested parties. BDCs,domestic and foreign manufacturers, importer-exporters, and labor associations are sources of product change petitions.
85. St. Maxens Interview, supra note 59. The Regulations specify generally
what a petition must include, but some discretion remains to build a strong economic argument for the particular action desired.
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sis" to support the petition. s6 A petition normally must contain
specific information on both domestic and BDC production, employment data, and cost and profit analyses in the applicable
product category. 7 The ITC also provides the GSP Subcommittee with impact analyses concerning the probable effects of a
product change petition on United States industries.8 8
The two most common reasons for rejecting interested party
petitions for product changes are insufficient documentation by
the petitioning party and repeated requests by a petitioner after
prior consideration and denial of a petition. 9 If a petitioner does
not commit these two errors, the Subcommittee then carefully assesses the request and renders a recommendation.
D.

Rules-of-Origin Requirements

The United States GSP scheme requires all eligible products to
originate entirely from an approved BDC. When eligible products
contain imported materials, the imported materials must undergo
a "substantial transformation" so that the final export product is
distinguishable from the assembly materials.9 0 The rules-of-origin
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Consultation with the ITC was not required until the 1984 Act changes,
see infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
89. St. Maxens Interview, supra note 59. The recommendation is reported
according to a set calendar schedule. Public hearings are held concerning petitions to be considered by the GSP Subcommittee and the date of the hearings
are announced in the Federal Register. The GSP calendar for product reviews is
contained in regulations section 2007.3:
(1) June 1, announcement of review,(2) July 15, deadline for receiving petitions;(3) August 1, announcement of accepted petitions;(4) September
15, public hearings;(5) March 1, effective date of changes. If the date specified is on, or immediately follows, a weekend or holiday, the effective date
will be on the second working day following such weekend or holiday date.
15 C.F.R. § 2007.3 (1985).
90. See Trade Act of 1974 § 503(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §
10.176-.178 (1985). The measure of the required transformation is generally the
amount of processing that will cause a change in Customs classification. Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 17, at 870 n.81. Thus, for articles not entirely produced in BDCs, Customs requires two transformations. First, any materials imported into a BDC for assembly into an eligible product must undergo
transformation substantial enough to change the Customs classification. Second,
the final product must also be changed into "a new and different article of commerce." See 19 C.F.R. § 10.176-10.177 (1985). For a detailed analysis of GSP
rules-of-origin, see Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 17, at 869-80 (the analysis
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requirements are designed to prevent countries which are ineligible for preferential treatment from merely routing their goods
through eligible BDCs to receive duty-free treatment.9 1
Rules-of-origin not only require that goods originate from certain countries but also require that the value added to the goods
when processed or assembled in these countries meets a specified
minimum level. The value added by the BDC must equal or exceed thirty-five percent of the value of the good based on the appraisal by United States Customs.2 Ambiguity arises over exactly
which BDC production "costs" will be included as "value added"
to the goods for purposes of the thirty-five percent requirement.9 3
Nevertheless, failure to meet the requirement clearly results in
the loss of GSP status for the article. The thirty-five percent rule
applies to all individual BDCs. As a result of an amendment to
the Trade Agreement Act of 1979,"4 the rule also applies to any of
three eligible "country associations." 9 5 For purposes of the thirtyfive percent value-added rule, these privileged associations are
treated as one country. Thus, the individual countries within an
association may cumulate their value added to the product so as
to qualify for the thirty-five percent threshold.

is outdated with respect to 1979 changes). See also generally, Customs Regulations and Other Procedures for the Application of GSP, 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.171-.178
(1985).
91. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Compendium of Rules of Origin Applied Under the GSP, at 9-12, U.N. Doc. TD/B/626
(1976).
92. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b)(2)(A) (1982).
93. See, e.g., Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 17, at 870; see also Orton,
The Profit Limitation in the GSP, 91 AM. IMPORT EXPORT BULL. 12 (Oct. 1979).
United States Customs officials have discretion to allocate costs for purposes of
the value-added requirement.
94. See 19 U.S.C. § 2461-2465 (1982). The original value-added requirement
for associations was set at 50%. See 19 C.F.R. § 10.176(b) (1977).
95. "Country Associations" refers to favored groups of trading nations which
are treated as one country for purposes of meeting the rules of origin requirements such that their cumulative value added to a product need constitute only
35%. The three country associations are: (1) member countries of the Caribbean
Common Market (CARICOM) including: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Christopher-Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago; (2) member countries of the Cartegena Agreement (Andean Group)
including: Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela; and (3) the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) including: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
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Valuation under the thirty-five percent rule is generally limited
to the BDCs' direct processing costs such as actual labor costs,
materials, tools and depreciation, freight, insurance, packaging,
taxes and duties on materials, and the costs of inspecting and
testing merchandise.9 6 All indirect expenses are excluded from
valuation.9 7 The United States Customs Office administers and
enforces the thirty-five percent rule. To ensure GSP eligibility for
a product, producers should obtain a definitive ruling from Customs to avert problems resulting from attempts to comply with
the rules-of-origin.9 8
E. The CNLs and the Graduation Concept
Procedures for removal of certain products from continued
GSP treatment are incorporated into the United States GSP
scheme through the application of either of two separate Competitive Need Limits (CNLs). One CNL is mandated by statute,
based upon rigid statistical data; the Executive may determine
the other CNL based upon a petitioning process. Mandatory removal of a product occurs when a BDC's shipment of a particular
article into the United States in any one year exceeds either of
two values: (1) the indexed monetary CNL ($57.7 million in
1983); or (2) the fixed limit of fifty percent of the value of total
United States imports of the article.9 9 Discretionary removal of
96. 19 C.F.R. § 10.177 and 10.178 (1985). See also, Nemmers & Rowland,
supra note 17, at 869-80 for a more detailed analysis.
97. 19 C.F.R. § 10.178(4)(b) (1985). These include profit and general expenses such as administrative salaries, casualty and liability insurance, advertising and salespersons' salaries, commissions or expenses.
For an intriguing argument that normal profit should be included in the calculation of the 35% value-added requirement, see Orton, supra note 93, at 12,
14.
98. See Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 17, at 880 & n.113 (authors recommend obtaining internal advice from Customs and explain procedures for granting policy statements).
99. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1)(A), (B) (1982). The 50%
CNL accounted for the exclusion of $10.7 billion in 1983 trade (compared to $7.1
billion in 1982). The petition review process removed from GSP treatment three
articles which had accounted for $33.5 million in 1983 trade. Any BDC product
removed under any form of CNL is eligible for redesignation after one year pursuant to the petitioning process and a requisite showing of changed circumstances, such that the CNLs no longer apply or a Presidential waiver is deserved. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(c)(5), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 3022. Table 3 of the Appendix shows the amount of
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products occurs on the basis of annual petition reviews by "interested parties"'10 0 and before either of the two statutory CNLs are
10
met. '
The United States limitations on the volume of preferential
trade under 10the
GSP are based upon a policy referred to as
"graduation.' 2 In 1981 graduation was introduced as the underlying basis for the discretionary removal from GSP eligibility of
certain products from specific BDCs before the statutorily specified limits on tariff-free trade were surpassed.10 3 The 1984 Act expanded the graduation concept to include the complete removal
of countries from continued GSP eligibility for all their products. 0 4 Graduation is designed to ensure the continuation and focus upon the GSP's primary goal of encouraging growth of infant
industries by the least developed of the developing nations. Graduation, in particular, emphasizes that GSP benefits are temporary
and reminds LDCs that they must someday become mature members of the international trading system.0 5
The United States scheme is unique in its combined use of
mandatory CNLs and discretionary removal through the petition
review process. Most other donor nations use quotas to protect
domestic producers from excessive GSP imports. 0 6 The United

trade affected by the CNLs and discretionary petition removals for the 1981-83
period.
100. See supra note 52 for explanation of the annual product reviews. The
GSP Subcommittee of the USTR coordinates the review process. See also Reviews Pertaining to Eligibility of Articles for the GSP, 15 C.F.R. § 2007 (1985)
(explaining information required in USTR petition review process).
Based upon petitions filed by United States producers and labor unions, certain products from Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong were removed from GSP eligibility. The excluded trade was valued at $183 million (compared to $95 million
granted in 1982). See SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES EFFECTIVE MARCH 30, 1984, supra note 66, at 1.
Increased rigor in enforcing removal of products through the petition review
process is clear: the total dollar value of removed GSP trade almost doubled
between 1982 and 1983.
101. See S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 4.
102. See generally Frank, The "Graduation"Issue for LDCs, 13 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 289 (1979) (explains development of the concept, details both sides of
the problem, and supports establishment of a new Committee on Graduation in

the GATT).
103. See 46 Fed. Reg. 37,115-16
104. See infra notes 184-88 and
105. See 46 Fed. Reg. 37,115-16
106. OECD REPORT, supra note

(1981).
accompanying text.
(1981).
27, at 40.
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States approach has met with much criticism. 01 7 Generally, domestic producers contend that graduation is not applied vigorously enough or is insufficient to meet their protection needs. 10 8
Domestic importers argue that the petition review process is unpredictable and dependent upon the exercise of too much executive discretion. 10 9 BDCs object to the arbitrary product removal
processes, claiming they undermine the economic incentive of the
entire GSP program. 1 0 Finally, LLDCs assert that CNLs and
graduation will not have the redistribution effects desired. A report by the Korean Traders' Association argues that statistical
data indicate that other developed countries benefit from GSP
trade excluded by imposing CNLs-not the developing
countries."'

Participants on various sides of the GSP scheme debate the

ability of CNLs to redistribute GSP benefits to the LLDCs, but
the fact remains that CNLs have been used increasingly as protection for domestic producers. In 1983, for the first time under
107. For example, the EEC has objected generally to the concept of graduation as a harbinger of increasing United States protectionism. See Wall St. J.
Mar. 13, 1985, at 38, cols. 1-2; see also OECD REPORT, supra note 27, at 59
(noting that the divergent views on the issue of "graduation" at least in part
reflect the apparent economic success of the GSP program since some BDCs
have used preferential access to the point of perceived damage to donor country
markets).
Criticism of the CNLs and the petition review process has come from developing countries seeking GSP benefits, domestic import/exporters and interested
parties seeking to gain discretionary application of the limits. See, e.g., Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 17, at 905-07.
108. See, e.g., Proposed Renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences,
1984: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 240-41 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Renewal of the GSP, 1984] (statement of Myron T. Foueaux of the Chemical Manufacturers Association).
109. Id. at 239-40.
110. For example, representatives from UNCTAD argue that the LLDCs are
not capable of capitalizing on the graduation of major beneficiary countries from
certain product categories because the LLDCs lack the industrial capacity to
switch to immediate production of sophisticated products and because most of
the products in which the LLDCs have great production potential are excluded
from GSP eligibility. If BDCs are immediately graduated for products in which
they prove competitive, the incentive to switch available production capacity is
diminished. See ProposedRenewal of the GSP, 1984, supra note 108, at 334-36
(statement from the Office of the Secretary General of UNCTAD).
111. See, e.g., ProposedRenewal of the GSP, 1984, supra note 108, at 334-35
(prepared statement by the Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD).
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the CNL system, the ratio of the dollar value of CNL-excluded
GSP goods to GSP imports surpassed a ratio of one to one. More
than $11.8 billion of GSP trade was excluded by the CNLs in
1983 alone. 112 In the early 1980s, and despite the touted redistributive goals of the CNL system, the LLDCs appear to be disproportionately unable to take advantage of GSP economic and developmental benefits. 113 Recent studies indicate that from
January to November 1983, the top five BDCs (Taiwan, Korea,
Hong Kong, Mexico and Brazil) enjoyed sixty-five percent of all
GSP benefits which totaled $9.87 billion for that period.114 In
contrast, the LLDCs received less than one percent of total GSP
benefits. 115 Early studies showed that after CNLs are applied, the
resulting gains in imports usually accrue to the developed or to
the advanced developing countries rather than to the LLDCs.116
Because of this skewed distribution of GSP benefits, Congress refined the CNL system with the expectation that more rigorous
application would provide tangible redistributions of GSP benefits. Toward this objective, Congress also recommended clarified
administrative procedures to enhance the effectiveness of the
CNLs and to encourage input from the private sector. 17
112. See S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 5; see also Table 2 of the
Appendix.
113. See generally, Lahoud, The "Non-Discriminatory"United States Generalized System of Preferences:De Facto DiscriminationAgainst the Least Developed Developing Countries, 23 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Lahoud]; see also INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMm,

Pus. No. 1384, CHANGES IN IM-

PORT TRENDS RESULTING FROM EXCLUDING SELECTED IMPORTS FROM CERTAIN
COUNTRIES FROM THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES, 26-28 (1983) [here-

inafter cited as ITC PUB. No. 1384] (concluding that preliminary data indicates
only weak redistribution effects can be attributable to exercising the CNLs: "Imports of similar products from associated countries did not seem to increase in
the year after exclusions were established." Id. at 28.)
114. See Proposed Renewal of the GSP, 1984, supra note 108, at 13.
115. See H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5103; see also generally Table 4 of the Appendix which
shows 1983 GSP imports from the leading BDCs in comparison with 1982 data
indicating per capita GNP of the beneficiary countries.
116. Id.
117. For example, the House Subcommittee on Trade recently noted that six
primary aspects of the petition process need attention: (1) the President should
develop a standard petition explaining information required to be submitted; (2)
the President should propose regulatory changes to prohibit reconsideration for
three years of petitions requesting additions to the list of eligible items absent a
showing of significant changed circumstances; (3) the petition decisionmaking
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RECENT

GSP

CHANGES: THE TRADE AND TARIFF ACT OF

1984

Recent GSP changes codified in the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984118 could significantly alter the program's developmental impact. However, the effect of these changes on the daily operations
of the GSP is presently unclear. Most of the 1984 changes affect
the discretionary and procedural operation of the program, leaving the basic organization and underlying principles of the GSP
scheme intact. Presently, Congress seems satisfied with the general GSP scheme but it could not resist the opportunity provided
by the need for renewal legislation in 1984 to further refine the
operation of the program.1 19
This section traces the major amendments found in the 1984

legislation (the 1984 Act), comments on how the changes differ
materially from prior law, and explains the underlying policies as
well as the potential significance of the new congressional
directives.

process should be exposed to more scrutiny by granting private review of information used to formulate decisions and by requiring a statement of the reasons
for conclusions reached; (4) parties interested in the petition process should be
given additional opportunities to submit information and comments, including
the chance to submit input to the ITC before preparation of the ITC report on
the probable economic effects of a petition review decision; (5) the President
should promulgate additional regulations clarifying and detailing requirements
for obtaining product modifications; and finally (6) parties interested in the implementation and protection of worker rights should be given the same participation privileges as other "interested parties" heard in the petition review process. See H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 24-26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG.& AD. NEWS at 5124-26.
118. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(98 Stat.) 3018.
119. The Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade expressed
basic approval of the GSP:
The Committee is satisfied that the GSP is operating as the Congress intended; that it poses for U.S. industries ... no significant threat of injurious import competition; and that the program remains a viable development tool and is important to the economic and foreign policy interests of
the United States.
S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 8.
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Extension of the GSP Until 1993

The 1984 Act extends the GSP until July 4, 1993, a period of
eight and one-half years.12 0 The United States GSP renewal period is two and one-half years less than that of other major OECD
countries. 121 This shorter extension period for the United States
means that the GSP schemes of all OECD countries will terminate at approximately the same time. Thus, in future multilateral
negotiations concerning GSP, in either the UNCTAD, GATT, or
OECD forums, all donor countries will be re-examining their systems at the same time. The original GSP concept was intended
only as a temporary program. 122 Consequently, the question of
whether to extend the scheme a second time likely will be a major
issue in the 1990s.
B.

The Competitiveness Factor as an Amendment to the
President's Basic Authority to Extend Preferences

The Trade Act of 1974 required the President to consider three
general factors when deciding generally whether to extend preferences under the GSP: (1) the effect such action would have on
furthering developing countries' economies; (2) the extent to
which other developed countries were comparably granting preferential access for products from developing countries; and (3)
the anticipated impact of extending preferences on United States
120. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(a), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 3023. The length of the extension represents a compromise between the Senate and House versions of the 1984 Act. The Senate bill (S.
1718), see S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 8, and the Reagan Administration,
see USTR News Release at 1, favored a ten year extension, but the House bill
(H.R. 6023), see H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5 at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 5122, called for a five-year extension period. The
resulting compromise, though not arithmetically exact, reflects the mutual desire
that future negotiations on possible reimplementation of the GSP not coincide
with a presidential election year. See USTR News Release at 1 (this release, like
subsequently cited news releases or white papers, is available from the author or
from the USTR).
121. See OECD REPORT, supra note 27, at 62-63, 65. Most noteworthy are
the ten-year extensions by the EEC, Japan and Canada.
Also, the United States was the last major donor country to implement its
GSP scheme, beginning January 1, 1976. Most of the other major GSP countries
passed initial legislation between 1971 and 1974. For example, the EEC scheme
came into force July 1, 1971, id. at 62, followed by Japan's on August 1, 1971, id.
at 64, and Canada's in July 1974, id. at 62.
122. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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producers of like or directly competitive products. 2 ' The 1984
Act adds a fourth consideration: "The extent of the beneficiary
developing country's competitiveness with respect to eligible articles.' 1 24 This "competitiveness" factor was added to Section 501
of the 1974 Act to emphasize congressional desire for a more rigorous application of graduation principles.' 25 The House Report
indicates that the new factor should be considered when evaluating the general economic progress of a BDC and when comparing
a BDC's competitive ability to that of both the United States and
other BDCs.' 26 The 1984 Act also adds the phrase "through an
expansion of their exports"'' 27 to Section 501(1) of the original
legislation, 28 clarifying the way in which the executive determines whether the grant of GSP benefits will expand the economy of a BDC. This language indicates that the primary economic goal of the GSP is the encouragement of exports from a

123. See § 501(l)-(3) of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1982).
124. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 502(4), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 3019.
125. The Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade stated:
The amendment... will serve to emphasize Congress' concern that the
current policy of discretionary graduation will be maintained ....
[T]he
Committee expects these factors to play a considerable role in the President's general review of eligible articles. .. [and they] will also be important to...
consideration of a waiver of the competitive need limitations ....
[T]he Committee intends that the President apply this new
fourth factor as an estimate of the general economic progress in the beneficiary country, and not as a strict measure of comparability to a competitive U.S. industry.
S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 10 (emphasis added). The House Bill tracks
similar language and places the same emphasis on the application of this new
standard: "[T]he Committee expects these factors to play a major role in the
general review of eligible articles ... [and also] with respect to waivers of competitive need limitations." H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 8 (emphasis
added).
126. See id.
127. See id. The criteria relevant to applying this factor include: (1) worldwide and United States market shares enjoyed by the BDC for certain products;
(2) total volume and value of BDC exports; and (3) ability of the BDC to penetrate foreign markets if regular MFN rates were applied rather than duty-free
rates under the GSP. Id.
128. See Section 501(1) of the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1982) (directs the President to consider whether granting GSP benefits will further the
development of the BDC); for a complete list of changes in the designation of
BDC since the GSP was implemented, see A GUIDE To GSP, supra note 66, at
85-86.
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developing country.
C.

Additional Limitations on Country Eligibility

Both the Senate and House included additional BDC criteria in
the 1984 Act.129 The Senate expressed concern about abusing intellectual property rights1 30 and trading in counterfeit goods by
GSP beneficiary countries. The Senate also criticized the increasing use of nontariff barriers (NTBs),' l3 particularly those barriers
that affect United States investment practices. The House, expressing similar concern about NTBs, 13 2 called for the elimination
of trade barriers in the services industries. 33 The House also insisted that before designating BDCs, the President must inquire
whether a country has taken or is taking steps to offer "internationally recognized worker rights.''34 Finally, the House added to
the list of BDC criteria under Section 502(c)(4) of the 1974 Trade
Act the requirement that the President consider the extent to
which a country "has assured the United States that it will re13 5
frain from engaging in unreasonable export practices."'
1.

NTBs and Barriers to Trade in Services

Many countries increasingly are employing nontariff barriers
(NTBs) to trade in order to distort world trade patterns to their
advantage. The most recent Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
129.

See generally S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3; H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5101.
130. See S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 10-11.For a brief general discussion
by the Secretary for International Trade at the Dept. of Commerce of the trade
distortion problems of NTBs as they affect United States investment abroad,
see Olmer, Barriers to U.S. Foreign Investment, 1983 PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD 63. See also Murray & Walter, Quantitative Restrictions, Developing
Countries,and GATT, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 391 (1977) (an excellent commentary on quantitative restrictions); Ewing, Non-Tariff Barriersand Non-Adjustment or International Trade: Review Article, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 63 (1984);
de Bouter, supra note 2, at 364-68; see generally, Fontheim & Gadbaw, Trade
Related Performance Requirements Under the GATT-MTN System and U.S.
Law, 14 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 129 (1982).
131. See S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 11.
132. See H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5112.

note 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S.

133. Id.
134. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(98 Stat.) 3019.
135. See infra text accompanying note 143.
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Negotiations focused GATT discussions on the growing problems
of NTBs. 136 The United States also continues to press for new
international accords on the use of these nontariff trade distorting mechanisms. The 1984 Act specifies that before designating eligible BDCs, the President must consider a country's use of
NTBs, particularly trade barriers to services. The general language of the provision appears to give the President great flexibility in regulating country eligibility. This discretion should prove
important to enforcement both because NTBs and services are
137
difficult to define and because NTBs exist in various forms.
The new anti-NTB criteria could augment presidential power
to designate eligible BDCs. On the other hand, the breadth and
vagueness of the anti-NTB criteria could alternatively prove to be
cumbersome to implement. If congressional intent is to be put
into practical form, then the anti-NTB criteria should be more
clearly defined and mechanisms should be established for their
application. Suggestions for improvement might include: (1)
guidelines specifying which types of NTBs will disqualify a country and the Volume of trade that must be affected before punishment will attach; (2) adequate monitoring mechanisms within an
agency responsive to public input; and (3) substantive international agreements on NTB standards. The anti-NTB criteria now
serve only as a political statement disapproving NTBs and indicating possible future congressional resolve to act on this issue if
multilateral regulation and cooperation is not forthcoming.
The 1984 Act specifically prohibits BDCs from using trade distorting barriers in service industries. 38 The services industry sec-

136. See Ewing, supra note 130, at 64.
137. The various forms of NTBs include: outright prohibitions on certain imports, voluntary export restraints, import licensing procedures, export subsidiaries, countervailing duties on imports, export performance requirements, government procurement practices, standards and packaging requirements,
quantitative restrictions and escape-clause relief measures. NTBs also include
complex customs practices such as labeling and marks of origin requirements,
import documentation, customs nomenclature, and valuation practices and procedures. See id. at 65.
138. "Service industry" is difficult to define. Generally, services include all
output not resulting from typical production sectors, such as agriculture, mining,
manufacturing and construction. See Liberalization of InternationalTrade in
the Service Sector: Threshold Problems and a Proposed Framework Under the
GATT, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371, 371 n.2 (1982). A more precise definition of
services reveals the potential magnitude of the expanding trade growth in this

area:
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tor is the leading growth area of United States trade. In 1980,
services trade accounted for approximately twenty-six percent of
private sector trade and produced a $38 billion net trade surplus. 39 The services sector now accounts for an estimated seven
out of ten American jobs and approximately sixty-five percent of
the United States Gross National Product. 140 Services sector
trade comprises approximately one quarter of total world trade
and has grown at a rate of seventeen percent over the last decade
compared to a growth rate of about six percent for world trade as
a whole.14 ' The United States is urging that international negotiations on trade in services be included in expected future rounds
of GATT negotiations.

42

As with NTBs, the ultimate policy objective of Congress in
making this change appears to be a desire to prompt international
discussions and agreements regarding the regulation of services
trade. Criteria that simply condemn the use of barriers to trade in
services by a BDC seeking GSP benefits, similar to the anti-NTB
criteria, could prove ineffective, absent further implementation
decisions by the executive branch agencies. If practical results are
to be achieved, regulations must be drafted to explain how this
new criteria is to be defined, monitored and applied. Despite the
immediate impracticality of this new criteria, it represents a
strong political statement aimed at the developing nations, indicating that Congress has taken special notice of the important
area of services trade and that the President now has authority to
withdraw or withhold BDC status based upon a country's openness to such trade.
[S]ervices means economic outputs which are tangible goods or structures,
including, but not limited to, transportation, communications, retail and
wholesale trade, advertising, construction, design and engineering, utilities,
finance, insurance, real estate, professional services, entertainment, and
tourism, and overseas investments which are necessary for the export and
sale of such services.
Id. at 377-78 n.38 (quoting S.1233, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(4), 127 CONG. REc.
S5371 (daily ed. May 20, 1981)).
139. See Liberalization of International Trade in the Services Sector:
Threshold Problems and a Proposed Framework Under the GATT, 5 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 371, 376 (1982); see generally, H. Gray, A Negotiating Strategy for
Trade in Services, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 377 (1983).
140. See Legal Problems in Expanding the Scope of GATT to Include
Trade in Services, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 281, 282 n.9 (1982-83).
141. Id. at 282.
142. Id. at 284.
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2.

UnreasonableExport Practices

As a precondition to GSP benefits, the 1984 Act requires the
President to consider a BDC's assurances that it will refrain from
engaging in "unreasonable export practices. '' 143 Because the legislative history of the GSP renewal act contains no implementation
guidelines, the executive should have much discretion to determine which export practices are "unreasonable." The legislative
history lacks substantive discussion of this particular amendment.
Presumably, Congress seeks to prohibit the BDCs' use of export
subsidies in any of their many various forms as another way to
distort the normal flow of trade to the advantage of the country
employing such practices. The USTR should publish more detailed regulations specifying the application and interpretation of
this criteria as applied to existing BDCs and potential future
BDC applicants.
3.

Protection of Worker Rights

The 1984 Act requires BDCs to respect internationally recognized worker rights. 44 This section of the 1984 Act generally refers to worker rights adopted in the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.145 In particular, the 1984 Act defines worker
rights as:
(a) the right of association;(b) the right to organize and bargain
collectively;(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor;(d) a minimum age for the employment of children; and(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect46to mini1
mum wages, hours, and occupational safety and health.
The specificity with which worker rights are defined in the 1984
Act, coupled with international consensus in this area, should
render this criteria more useful than the previous two BDC criteria. The worker rights criteria may still prove difficult to monitor.
However, previous legislation unrelated to the GSP may partially
solve monitoring problems. Pursuant to Section 116(d) of the
1961 Foreign Assistance Act, the President must submit to Con143. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS
(98 Stat.) 3018.
144. See id.
145. See H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 5112 (1984).
146. See id. at 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS at 5111.
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gress an annual report on worker rights. 4 7 This report is prepared
jointly by the Human Rights sections of the Departments of State
and Labor. 14 The House Subcommittee on Trade intended that
the review required for GSP purposes will be included as a separate section within this annual report.1 49 The review specifically
must address the progress of all BDCs in each category of the
statutory definition of worker rights. 50 The House Subcommittee
recommends that the USTR establish formal procedures to apply
the new worker rights standard. These procedures should allow
for at least one annual public hearing at which parties can either
offer testimony or submit written comments on BDC eligibility
based on regard for internationally recognized worker rights. 5
The scope of the standard for testing a BDC's progress in protecting internationally recognized worker rights appears broad
and reflects the concerns of powerful domestic labor organizations
such as the AFL-CIO.' 52 The House Subcommittee expressed
support for organized labor's concerns, but tempered their support with realism about the level of worker rights that BDCs are
expected to achieve:
It is not the expectation of the Committee that developing countries come up to the prevailing labor standards of the United
States ....
However, the Committee does expect the President
,. . to require that any developing country specifically demonstrate respect for the internationally recognized rights of its

workers ....

13

The Congressional goal of the worker rights criteria is to prevent
negative incidental effects resulting from the denial of worker
rights, such as perpetual poverty, limited benefits of economic
growth, continued existence of privileged elites and a foundation
147. Id. at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5122.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5126.
151. Id. at 25-26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5125-26.
152. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5126.
153. At Committee hearings, the AFL-CIO strongly advocated either not renewing the GSP or at least graduating Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong as well as
narrowing CNLs. The AFL-CIO only secondarily supported the worker rights
criteria as a falback position. See ProposedRenewal of the GeneralizedSystem
of Preferences: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Finance Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 87-90, 90-97 (Jan. 27, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as HearingsBefore Subcomm. on Int'l Trade].
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for social instability and political rebellion.'"
The office of USTR, however, opposed the addition of this
worker rights criteria to the list of other BDC criteria. 15 5 The
USTR has not publically explained its opposition to the worker
rights criteria; however, the USTR may disapprove because this
criteria necessitates increased administrative burdens. The USTR
may also be reluctant to impose standards on an aid and incentive program that seek to influence the domestic labor situations
of foreign sovereigns when a predominant motive is arguably to
regulate internal social behavior rather than to protect United
States and worldwide economic interests.
4. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
When designating BDCs, the President must also consider "the
extent to which such country is providing adequate and effective
means under its laws for foreign nationals to secure, to exercise,
and to enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, including
patents, trademarks, and copyrights. 156 The "adequate and effective means" test requires examination of the following five factors: (1) extent, scope and duration of statutory protection; (2)
remedies afforded aggrieved parties; (3) governmental willingness
and ability to enforce rights on behalf of foreign nationals; (4)
ability of foreign nationals to enforce their own rights; and (5)
absence of legal formalities or similar requirements that present
practical obstacles to meaningful protectionJ 57 Using this broad
statutory test, the President is directed to consult with both the
Copyright and Patent and Trademark Offices as well as other
"appropriate parties" to fashion a more specific set of criteria "to
be applied consistently and objectively."15 s
Intellectual property rights are an important source of United
States commerce, yet these rights are increasingly abused by ma154. H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 11, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5111.
155. See USTR white-paper, supra note 120 (summarizing the Generalized
System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984).
156. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(98 Stat.) 3019 (emphasis added).
157. S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 11. Congress used the broader term
"foreign nationals" rather than "United States" to protect non-United States
licensees of rights held by United States nationals. See id.
158. See id.
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jor trading nations in general, and by certain GSP beneficiary
countries in particular. 159 The International Trade Commission
(ITC) estimated that in 1982 alone, United States firms lost between six to eight billion dollars in both domestic and export
sales as a result of foreign product counterfeiting and similar
trade practices. 106 The United States lost an estimated 131,000
jobs in just five product sector areas from the abuse of intellectual property rights."' 1 East Asian countries are most often the
primary sources of counterfeit products. 162 Other countries, how-

ever, with the necessary skill and equipment to pirate goods (for
example, Mexico and Brazil) are also known as violators of intellectual property rights.16 3 Many countries violating intellectual
property rights to the detriment of United States industry and
employment are also GSP beneficiary countries.'" Proponents of
the intellectual property amendment to the 1984 Trade Act insist
the new criteria is equitable and promotes a more responsible international trading system. 1 5
159. For an excellent general discussion of the importance of intellectual
property rights by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, see Mossinghoff, The Importance of Intellectual
Property Protection in International Trade, 7 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 235
(1984); see generally, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1983 COMMISSION OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS ANNUAL REPORT 21
(1984).
160. S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 10.

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Concerns of United States private industry were expressed at recent
Senate hearings on GSP, where representatives of domestic recording companies
cited Singapore, India and Taiwan as frequent sources of counterfeit records
and tapes. See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, supra note 153,
at 193-94 (prepared testimony of Stanley M. Gortikov, Pres., Recording Industry Assoc. of America).
164. S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 10.
165. Statements by representatives of the recording industry reveal the goal
of the intellectual property rights criteria:
Significant proposals for reform are already under consideration in Taiwan
and in the Philippines, and the government of Singapore is in the process
of drafting new copyright legislation. An intellectual property amendment
to the GSP legislation would send a timely message to these governments
encouraging the passage of new and effective copyright measures. It would
encourage other nations to follow suit, and would provide an incentive for
vigorous enforcement of copyright laws in all developing countries.
See HearingsBefore Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, supra note 153, at 197.
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The United States is dedicated to seeking increased protection
for intellectual property rights at the multilateral and bilateral
negotiating levels166 as well as through domestic legislation. On a

multilateral level, strong United States support at the General
Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization has
generated concerted efforts to establish and improve protections
which other nations afford intellectual property rights.16 7 Additionally, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is
working closely with the USTR to draft an effective anticounterfeiting code under the GATT. 6 8 On a bilateral level, the
PTO, along with USTR, the Department of State, and the ITC,
have raised intellectual property issues in recent trade discussions
with officials from Mexico, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia.1 69

Finally, recently proposed domestic legislation would apply strict
criminal sanctions and increased civil remedies for counterfeiting
patented goods. 70
5.

Other Modifications of BDC Criteria

The 1984 Act also makes two minor changes regarding designation of BDCs. First, the Act adds the phrase "including patents,
trademarks, or copyrights," to section 502(b)(4) subparagraphs
(A),(B) and (C), emphasizing that intangible intellectual property
is to be considered in the same manner as other forms of tangible
property when evaluating BDC eligibility under the specified criteria.17 1 Second, Hungary is deleted from the original list of devel-

oped donor countries previously excluded from GSP benefits
under the section 502(b) list.172 This change makes Hungary eligible for BDC status pending future application and approval.
166. See generally The Outlook for Trade Talks Brightens, FORTUNE, Mar.
18, 1985, at 139.
167. See Mossinghoff, supra note 159, at 247 (1984).
168.

Id. at 248.

169. Id.
170. Id. See H.R. 2447, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H.1861 (daily
ed. Apr. 7, 1983); S. 875, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S.3646 (daily ed.
Mar. 22, 1983).
171. See S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 11.
172. This action recognizes that although Hungary once considered itself a
developed country and was one of the first donor countries to implement its own
GSP scheme in 1971, Hungary's per capita GNP in 1982 ($2,270) was less than
the per capita GNP of several present BDCs named under the United States
scheme.
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D. Congressional Guidelines for Graduation and Restrictions
on Presidential Waiver of CNLs
In an effort to ensure administration of the GSP program consistent with the goals discussed earlier, Congress delineated
guidelines for strengthening CNLs and graduation while also
placing specific limits on executive waiver discretion. Without
these directives, the President has considerable flexibility while
implementing the broad rules of the GSP scheme. Since Congressional response is slow by nature, and since other important matters compete for Congressional attention, the 1984 Act changes
build in parameters to Executive decisionmaking and establish
procedures for continuing Congressional input into the GSP program. The new changes continue to reflect policy decisions to assist LLDCs, to entice or coerce the NICs into playing a more mature role within the international trading system, and to enhance
market growth opportunities of United States exporters that occur incidentally to increased GSP stimulated trade ties.173
1. The Required General Review and Report to Congress
The 1984 Act requires the President to conduct a General Review of all countries and products under the GSP, to be completed no later than January 4, 1987, and repeated periodically
thereafter. 17 ' The Review must determine whether a BDC "has
demonstrated a sufficient degree of competitiveness (relative to
other beneficiary developing countries) with respect to any eligible article.

' 17

In making this crucial determination, the President

presumably will apply the several criteria currently used in ad173. See S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 14, where the Subcommittee on
International Trade states:
In practice, these more stringent competitive need limits will most affect
products from the advanced developing countries that are the major program beneficiaries. These countries offer the greatest opportunity for U.S.
export growth, but in many cases have been slow to adopt in this regard
the obligations and responsibilities of the international trading
system....

[The] waiver authority is intended to encourage advanced developing
countries to adopt policies commensurate with increasing development-a
goal of GSP programs.
174. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(c)(2)(A), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG, & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3020.
175. Id. § 505(c)(2)(B), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS (98
Stat.) 3020-21.
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ministrative decision making plus the two new criteria regarding
intellectual property rights and equitable and reasonable market
access. 17 Using these criteria, the President must decide whether
to apply the old competitive need limits or the new limits, which
essentially reduce the old limits by one-half.'
The 1984 Act also requires the President to submit a report to
Congress, no later than January 4, 1988, advising legislators on
the actions taken "to withdraw, to suspend, or to limit the application of duty free treatment with respect to any country which
has failed to adequately take the actions described in section
502(c)" (the mandatory BDC criteria). 7 8 Thus, Congress intends
to monitor closely future administrative application of the new
criteria.
2. PresidentialDiscretion to Impose Stricter CNLs
(a) The New Limits
Section 504(c)(2)(B) of the 1984 Act gives the President authority to apply stricter CNLs to eligible articles from BDCs
based upon the forthcoming General Review. 7 9 Included in those
176.

The seven criteria already established in law and administrative proce-

dure are:
(1) the developmental level of individual beneficiaries;
(2) the beneficiary country's competitiveness in a particular product;
(3) the overall interests of the United States;

(4) the effect such action will have on furthering the economic development of developing countries;

(5) whether or not other major developed countries are extending generalized preferential tariff treatment to such product or products;

(6) the anticipated impact of such action on United States producers of
like or competitive products; and

(7) the extent to which the beneficiary country has assured the United
States it will provide equitable and reasonable access to the markets and
basic commodity resources of such country.
S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 13.
The two new factors include: (1) effective recognition of intellectual property
rights; and (2) the extent to which a country employs trade distorting investment practices and other non-tariff barriers to trade. Id.
177. See USTR white-paper, supra note 120 (summarizing the GSP renewal
Act changes).
178. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(a)(2), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 3020.
179. Id. § 505(c)(2)(B), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98
Stat.) 3020-21.
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stricter CNLs are a lowered $25 million ceiling, to be indexed to
future changes in the nominal Gross National Product (GNP) of
the United States, and a reduced twenty-five percent limit on total GSP market share for any particular good.18 0 Application of
these stricter CNLs would decrease the GSP opportunities for
products from countries deemed sufficiently competitive under
the General Review. The purpose of applying these lower CNLs is
to encourage a redistributive effect of GSP benefits to less efficient BDCs.1 s1
(b) Categorical Exemption of LLDCs and the President's
Waiver Discretion
The 1984 Act unconditionally exempts all United Nations designated LLDCs from application of the stricter CNLs.18 2 The
Senate Subcommittee on International Trade explains that this
,policy attempts to "encourage a greater dispersion of the GSP
program's benefits among the 140 countries potentially eligible to
take part in it.' ' 1s3 The President has no authority to deny any of
the LLDCs this special status granted by Congress.
(c) Mandatory Graduation
The 1984 Act also implements a new concept of total country
graduation when a BDC attains a specified "applicable limit" of
development, based upon per capita GNP. 1 84 The applicable per
capita GNP limit, above which a BDC must be graduated, is

180. The previous limit on total GSP market share for any good was 50%.
See id. § 504(c)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(98 Stat.) 3021.
181. The effectiveness of stricter CNLs for redistributing GSP benefits is debated. See Lahoud, supra note 113, at 15 & n.78 (for commentary that most

LLDCs will not be able to take advantage of market opportunities vacated by
graduated products from NICs); cf. Frank, The "Graduation"Issue for LDCs,
13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 289 (1979) (on the effectiveness of graduation as a policy).
182. Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(c)(6)(A), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD, Nsws (98 Stat.) 3022. The countries recognized by the U.N. as least less
developing countries are listed in Table 2 of the Appendix.
183. S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 15-16.
184. This limit on the applicable per capita GNP limit is indexed to one-half
the increase in nominal United States GNP. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, §
505(Q(2)(A)(i) and (ii), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98
Stat.) 3023-24.
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$8,500. 18*
Although the per capita GNP limit places a ceiling on develop-

ment for GSP countries, the limit probably will not affect any
present BDCs during the extended GSP program. Singapore is

the only country near the limit, with a $5,910 GNP in 1982.188
Two BDCs that may approach the limit in the next decade are
Hong Kong and Israel, with GNPs of $5,340 and $5,090 respec-

tively.18 7 If a BDC reaches the applicable limit, the BDC will be
graduated for a two year period during which the lower-tier CNLs
will apply. After two years, BDCs with per capita GNPs above
$8,500 would be excluded completely from the GSP program.'

This mandatory country graduation reflects congressional intent
to limit GSP benefits solely to developing countries and to limit
presidential discretion when applying existing CNLs.
3.

Changes in the President's Waiver Authority

(a) Waiver Authority for the New Stricter CNLs
Despite a determination that a BDC is already competitive in
the export of a particular item, section 505(c)(3)(A) grants the
President the authority to waive the applications of the stricter
CNLs with respect to any GSP eligible article. 8 9 Nonetheless,
this authority is subject to certain procedures and is conditioned
90
upon advice from the International Trade Commission (ITC)
185. Id. Per capita GNP is to be measured by the "best available information, including that of the World Bank." Id.
186. See USTR news release at 2.
187. See H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 4, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5104 (1984). Table 4 of the Appendix gives United States
total imports and GSP imports in 1983 from leading BDCs and 1982 per capita
GNP.
188. Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(f)(2)(B), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 3023.
189. See id. § 505(c)(3)(A), reprinted in 1984 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
(98 Stat.) at 3021.
190. The independent International Trade Commission assists the President
and Congress by conducting quantitative impact analyses on various aspects of
the GSP program. Before presidential waiver decisions are made, the ITC
should advise the President by reporting the degree of injurious effects on U.S.
industries likely to result from a proposed waiver. The ITC has also published
general economic and data impact analyses of the GSP program. See U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, CHANGES IN IMPORT TRENDS RESULTING FROM EXCLUDING SELECTED IMPORTs FROM CERTAIN CoUNTRIES FROM THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF

PREFERENCES, PuB. No.

1384 (May 1983); INT'L

TRADE COMM'N, PRESmENT'S LIST
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that no United States industry would be "adversely affected by
such waiver." 191 The "adversely affected" standard is intended to
test for "any likely detrimental impact on U.S. industries without
regard to whether a firm or an industry would be considered injured under standards elsewhere promulgated in U.S. trade
laws.' 19 2 Therefore, this standard calls for a lesser degree of "in-

jury" than required foi actions under section 301, which governs
93
import relief from unfair trade practices.1
When deciding whether to waive the stricter CNL under Section 505(c)(3)(A), the President must give due consideration to
the extent to which a BDC: (a) has assured equitable and reasonable access to its markets and commodity resources; and (b) provides adequate and effective means under its laws for foreign nationals to secure, exercise, and enforce intellectual
property rights
9 4
copyright.1
and
trademark,
patent,
including
(b) Specific Maximum Limits on Presidential BDC Product
Waiver Discretion
In order to ensure that its reform goals for GSP are not
thwarted, Congress limited the President's section 505(c)(3)(A)
discretionary waiver authority in two ways. First, the President's
505(c)(3)(A) waiver authority in any given year is limited to
thirty percent of the total value of all GSP articles entering the
195
United States duty free during the preceding calendar year.
oF ARTICLES WHICH MAY BE DESIGNATED OR MODIFIED AS ELIGIBLE ARTICLES FOR

PURPOSES OF THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES, PUB. No. 1620 (Dec.

1984).
191. Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 504(c)(3)(A)(i), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 3021. The three required procedures include: (1) ITC
advice about whether any United States industry is "likely to be adversely affected by such waiver;" (2) presidential determination that a waiver is "in the
national economic interest of the United States;" and (3) publication of the
presidential determination in the Federal Register. Id.
192. S.REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 14.
193. Id. at 15. Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2411)
the President is authorized to take all appropriate action to end any trade practice by a foreign government that: (1) violates international trade agreements or

is unjustifiable and (2) injuriously burdens or restricts United States commerce

under section 301. The burden of proving injury can be substantial at times. See
A PREFACE TO TRADE, supra note 18, at 115.
194. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2464(c)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
195. Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(c)(3)(D)(i), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) at 3021. In 1983 GSP free imports totaled $10.8
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Second, if the BDC either had a per capita GNP of $5,000 or
more, not indexed, or exported GSP articles valued at ten percent
or more of the total GSP imports for the calendar year, 196 then
the President may not exercise waiver authority over a quantity
of eligible articles from a BDC that exceeds fifteen percent of the
total value of all GSP articles entering the United States for that
year. 197
(c) Retention of Presidential Waiver Authority
The 1984 Act extends the grant of presidential waiver authority
over the CNLs originally made in the 1974 Trade Act.19 This authority is limited by specific congressional criteria and procedures
to guide executive decision making. The 1984 Act continues the
procedures under the 1974 Act allowing the President to waive
application of CNLs when the new provisions do not prohibit
waiver and when three determinations are made about the country. First, the President must determine that an historical preferential trade relationship with the United States exists. Second, a
treaty or trade agreement covering economic relations must exist.
Finally, the country must not discriminate against or impose unjustifiable or unreasonable barriers to United States commerce. 99
This holdover executive waiver authority over CNLs has never
been used. The waiver was originally intended to apply only to
the Philippines. 00 In the legislative history of the 1984 Act, Conbillion. See USTR News Release, supra note 120. Thus, the 30% limit for 1983
would have equaled $3.24 billion.

196. See USTR News Release, supra note 120.
197. Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(c)(3)(D)(ii), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CONG.

CODE

& An. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 3021. In 1983, for example, this 15% ceiling

would equal $1.62 billion.

These general limits on presidential waiver authority track the changes implemented by the Senate bill. The House bill would have structured BDCs into

three economic categories and mandated applicable CNLs depending upon categorization. Thus, presidential discretion would have been reduced further under
the House bill. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 18-21, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5118-21.
198. S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 15.
199. Id.
200. This special waiver provision for the Philippines arose out of unique
historical circumstances. At the time the original GSP legislation was enacted in
1974, the United States sought reciprocal economic relations with this island
country of key military importance. The United States and the Philippines were
negotiating a treaty that was expected to call for reciprocal conditions for trade
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gress expressed hope that the Philippines would negotiate for future waiver status.0 1 Congress stated, however, that the waiver
"should not be exercised absent clear commitments [by the Philippines] regarding better treatment for U.S. exporters and
'' 202
investors.
E.
1.

Other 1984 Modifications of the GSP Laws

Extension of the No-Domestic-Producer Waiver

Under the United States GSP system, there is an automatic
waiver of the fifty percent CNL for a particular article of commerce if a like or directly competitive good was not produced in
the United States as of January 3, 1975.203 The policy behind the
no-domestic-producer waiver is a lack of economic concern for the
fifty percent CNL for certain articles when no domestic producers
are affected. The statutory dollar value CNL, however, continues
to apply.204 A significant amount of GSP trade is allowed by this
waiver provision.20 5 Most of the items waived into eligibility consist of specialty agricultural products, such as chickpeas,
garbanzos, water chestnuts, and lentils, or special minerals and
oils, such as thorium nitrate and salts, as well as shark, eucalyp20 6
tus and sesame oils.
The 1984 Act extends the policy of automatic waiver of the fifty
percent CNL for articles which are not produced domestically as
of the changed date of January 3, 1984. 2 By moving the test
date forward ten years, Congress preserved the waiver, but
and investment. The waiver authority was originally implemented to avoid conflict with these ongoing treaty negotiations. Because no treaty agreement was
ever reached, the waiver has never been exercised, although the authority theo-

retically still exists. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. The no-domestic-producer waiver is contained in section 504(d) of the
1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2464 (1982).
204. See A GUIDE To GSP, supra note 66, at 63-66 (includes brief descriptions and TSUS numbers for all articles eligible for the no-domestic-producer
waiver). The Trade Policy Staff Committee of the USTR makes all decisions as
to whether an article is eligible for the waiver. Id. at 63.

205. See A
206.
207.
CONG.

GUIDE TO

GSP, supra note 66, at 63-66.

Id.
See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(c)(1)(B), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws (98 Stat.) at 3020 (amending the 1974 Trade Act

§ 504(c)(1)(B)).
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granted CNL protection for any domestic producer of articles
that originated production in the interim ten year period. The extension of the no-domestic-producer waiver benefits all participants in the United States GSP: the BDCs benefit from the amelioration of the effects of the CNLs on specialty goods; USTR
benefits from simplified procedures in the administration of the
program; and finally, United States consumers benefit from lower
import prices for specialty goods.
2. Raised De Minimus Waiver Limit
Section 504(d) of the 1974 Trade Act authorized the President
to automatically waive the fifty percent CNL with respect to any
article from a BDC if the total dollar value of the article from
that country did not exceed a yearly de minimus figure. 20 8 The
annually changing de minimus figure is that which does not exceed the amount which bears the same ratio to $1 million as the
United States GNP for that next year bears to the United States
GNP for 1979.209 The policy underlying the de minimus waiver
provision is similar to that for the no-domestic-producer waiver.
The goal is to ameliorate the harsh application of the fifty percent CNL which would exclude certain BDC products from continued preferential treatment when only a small dollar volume of
trade in a specialty item is at issue.
The new legislation raises the indexed de minimus limit from
approximately $1 million to approximately $5 million, thus allowing more specialty products from BDCs to enter the market
without being foreclosed by the fifty percent CNL.2 10 Whenever
the total value of GSP imports of a product falls below the de
minimus dollar figure, the President automatically waives application of CNLs without exercising the formal waiver procedures
otherwise required. The de minimus limit is indexed annually using 1979 as the base year; therefore, the actual 1984 limit was $6.8
million.2 1 1 Many BDCs and GSP importers have advocated a
raised de minimus provision.2 12 The rationale supporting the de
208. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(d) (1982).
209. See S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 16.
210. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
(98 Stat.) 3022.
211. See USTR News Release at 2-3.
212. See, e.g., Truett & Truett, Mexico and the GSP: Problems and Prospects, 34 INTER-Am. ECON. AFF. 67 (Summer 1980).
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minimus provision is that it reduces the administrative burdens
on both USTR and Customs and also assures United States exporters and importers of the acceptance of specialty articles that
could 213
otherwise be subject to the fifty percent competitive need
limit.

3. Calendar Changes
The 1974 Trade Act required the President to implement annual changes in GSP product coverage, resulting from application
of the competitive need limits, within ninety days of the close of
the calendar year.214 As a result of this procedure under the 1974
Act, executive orders announcing proposed changes typically were
issued too near to the actual implementation date. Lack of sufficient notice caused planning problems for both BDC exporters
and United States importers.215 The complex nature of international commercial transactions requires deals to be negotiated
sometimes months in advance. The schedule for GSP product
changes under the 1974 Act often surprised dealers and foreclosed
any opportunity to adjust arrangements. 26 This uncertainty surrounding application of the CNLs frustrated United States importers who could not plan on an article's continued eligibility
from year to year. 2 7 The 1984 Trade Act requires that CNL

changes in product coverage be implemented by July 1 of the succeeding year.2 18 This extends the implementation date by ninety
days. Assuming the changes are announced on or near the previous deadline, the new implementation deadline gives both BDCs
and importers more notice as to which articles are duty free.21 9
213. See S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 16.
214. See Trade Act of 1974, § 504(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2461 et. seq. The close of
the calendar year is March 31.
215.

Serko, Swaying the GSP, AM. ItPORT EXPORT BULL. at 6 (Aug. 1982).

216. United States importers may have purchased goods from foreign suppli-

ers months before the GSP product changes, and in turn, may have sold the
goods before delivery with the sales price based on the assumption that the
goods were duty free. Since the date the goods enter United States Customs is
determinative of GSP eligibility-rather than the date of export or the date of
purchase order-importers are annually faced with duty payments that are virtually unavoidable by foresight or planning. Id.

217. Id.
218. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 505(c)(3)(A), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws (98 Stat.) at 3021.
219. The House Report clearly states that the purpose of the calendar
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4. Articles Which May not be Designated as GSP Eligible
The 1984 Act amends the "import-sensitive" category of articles by specifying that footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods,
work gloves, and leather wearing apparel may not be made GSP
eligible in the future.220 Thus, these articles are prohibited from
discretionary executive grant as GSP eligible. The executive had
not decided to grant eligibility status to these articles, but the
Committee determined that a statutory exception similar to that
given certain other products was necessary to prevent their possible designation in the future.221 This amendment merely represents congressional desire to revoke executive authority to redesignate products considered import sensitive. The footwear
specification is largely repetitive, as virtually all footwear articles
were excluded from eligibility under the initial GSP product lists
in 1974.222 The absolute exclusion of these products from GSP
eligibility aligns GSP product coverage of these articles with the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, a program which is
similar to GSP in some respects and also is administered by the
office of USTR.

223

change is to facilitate planning decisions for persons using the GSP and not to
grant more time for administering decisionmakers:
This change is intended to allow U.S. Customs Service and the trading
public sufficient time to adjust to modifications in product eligibility... and for the ITC to publish such changes in the tariff schedules....
The purpose . . .is to provide advance notice ... it is not intended to
extend the time period for the President to make and announce his decisions.... The Committee expects... the President will publish.., by
April 1 of each year so that the remaining 3-month period to July 1 may
be used by all parties to prepare for the implementation....
H.R. REP. No. 1090, supra note 5, at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5122.
220. S. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 12.
221. Id.
222. See USTR News Release at 1.
223. See id. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is a United States aid initiative to help Central American and Caribbean island countries strengthen
their economics with the hope that economic stability will lead to political stability in the region. The CBI was passed on August 5, 1984 as part of the Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 201-231, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEWS (97 Stat.) 384-98. One aspect of the CBI directly parallels the GSP in
that zero tariffs are granted for certain eligible products originating from select
countries within the region. Since the office of USTR administers both programs, it is important for purposes of applying the rules of origin requirements
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5. ProceduralClarificationof Rules-of-Origin Determinations
The 1984 Act further amends section 503 of the 1974 Trade Act
by clarifying that the Secretary of the Treasury must prescribe
regulations governing GSP rules-of-origin requirements after consultation with the USTR.224 Congress agreed that the USTR deserved to participate in rules-of-origin regulations since the
USTR is responsible for administering both the GSP and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) tariff preference schemes.225
Congress, although intending for the rules-of-origin requirements
to be administered jointly, noted that the ultimate responsibility
for the final content of the regulations will rest with the Treasury
22
Department.
6. Required Agricultural Assistance Planningfor LDCs
A completely new requirement added in 1984 directs executive
branch agencies to assist BDCs in ensuring that emphasis on agricultural exports under the GSP does not undermine a country's
food production for domestic consumption. 227 This amendment

was apparently part of a "Bread for the World" proposal to add
another criteria to be considered before designating BDCs: the
extent to which a country is attempting to meet the nutritional
needs of its population and is not simply using its resources to
produce agricultural commodities for GSP export.228 The Bread
for the World organization suggested that the GSP amendment
be patterned after the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act,
that product eligibility remain similar.
224. This amendment was made at the USTR's request. See Pub. L. No. 98573, § 504(a), reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 3020;
see also supra notes and accompanying text (for general discussion of rules-of-

origin requirements).
225. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
226. Id.
227. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 506, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS (98 Stat.) at 3023. Section reads:
The appropriate agencies of the United States shall assist beneficiary developing countries to develop and implement measures designed to assure
that the agricultural sectors of their economies are not directed to export

markets to the detriment of the production of foodstuffs for their
citizenry.
Id. at 3023.
228. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, supra note 153, at

295-96 (statement of Bread for the World).
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which includes a Stable Food Production Plan to ensure that
duty free treatment granted sugar and beef does not harm the
nutritional status of persons in countries exporting such
products.229
Although the issue is hotly debated, the displacement of domestic food production due to export incentives offered by GSP
may not be substantial enough to merit this additional criteria or
the accompanying procedural and supervisory responsibilities
which naturally would follow. First, agricultural trade under the
GSP is limited in scope. Department of Agriculture figures for
1980 indicate that agricultural imports accounted for only approximately seventeen percent of GSP.23 0 Second, while the displacement effects of GSP incentives on agriculture could be significant within certain regions of individual countries, countries
with efficient domestic distribution programs arguably could use
export earnings from their sales of fruit and vegetables to
purchase, on the world market, badly needed wheat, corn, rice,
and other staple products. 3
Whether or not one agrees with the policies behind this amendment, clarifications are needed for its implementation. The legislative history of the 1984 Act fails to specify agency actions required pursuant to this agricultural assistance amendment. The
Reagan Administration opposed the assistance provision, 3 2 presumably because of the added procedural burdens to the USTR
and other agencies. If this proposed criteria is to be effective, the
Administration should clarify: (1) the nature of assistance to be
offered; (2) the operation of the program; and (3) the manner in
which BDCs are to be selected for assistance.

229.

Id. The Bread for the World organization noted that it was not logical

to increase incentives for LLDCs to export crops, even though valuable foreign
exchange may be earned, because the effect is to deter production of basic subsistence crops that provide for domestic needs. The Philippines, for example,
has a highly developed export sector (coconut products, sugar, bananas, pineap-

ples). Yet in 1973, it was estimated that 70% of the Filipino population was
malnourished and in 1982 more than 2.5 million Filipinos were recipients of U.S.

food assistance. Id.
230.

Id. at 295.

231.

See, e.g., id. at 79 (statement by Sen. Danforth).

232. See USTR white-paper, supra note 120 (summarizing the Generalized
System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984).
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The GSP attempts to serve broad purposes simultaneously,
which causes a healthy amount of conflict in the functioning of
the United States program. First, the GSP acts as a political symbol to the UNCTAD nations of United States concern for the industrial development needs of LDCs. Second, the GSP uses tariff
differentials to encourage BDCs' economic development,' increased export earnings and strengthened trade ties with the
United States. Third, import control mechanisms are maintained
to protect domestic producers and the GSP program is promoted
domestically as both practical foreign policy, and as sensible economics with benefits for United States consumers. To effectuate
these goals, political sensitivity is necessary to placate domestic
producers angered by the grant of preferences to foreign competitors to sell in United States markets. Fourth, the GSP qualifies or
conditions the grant of preferential trading status upon demonstrated participation in international trade forums and respect for
established GATT rules. Thus, the GSP is both an incentive program, within established limits, and a subtle means of coercing
desired action from BDCs. The present form of the United States
GSP merely reflects compromises necessary to implement these
sometimes disparate goals within the scheme.
The 1984 Act changes generally reflect four trends in the evolution of the United States GSP program. These trends originate
from the continuing need for political, economic, and procedural
refinement of the program. The first trend is an increased desire
for the GSP to produce tangible economic results in the poorest
BDCs.2 33 The central policy being used to address this first trend
is an expanded use of the graduation concept. The primary economic concern of the 1984 Act is the redistribution of GSP benefits among the LLDCs by removal of competitive products from
BDCs or by removal of certain BDCs from the GSP program altogether. Whether the method chosen will effectuate the desired
ends remains to be seen. Some doubt exists whether the LLDCs
actually will be helped by use of the existing two-tier CNLs, or by
the use of discretionary product graduation and mandatory country graduation based on per capita GNP.2 34 Preliminary ITC data
indicates that the desired redistribution may never occur solely as

233.
234.

See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.

19851

RENEWAL OF THE GSP

a result of the 1984 Act changes. Many LLDCs simply lack the
skills, capital, and internal structure to fill vacant market demands for manufactured and semimanufactured goods once leading BDCs are graduated.2 35 Certainly, more intense scrutiny of
the problem and reliable data will aid in the further refinement of
the GSP program to meet the desired redistribution goals. As a
step in this direction, the ITC should conduct a targeted economic study measuring the redistribution effects on LLDCs of
strengthened graduation principles.
The United States GSP will probably maintain graduation
principles even if the desired redistribution to LLDCs proves
minimal. This is predictably so because the policy supporting
graduation also includes the desire to coerce the NICs into trading under multilateral GATT principles and not those of a preferential grant.236 Both congressional and executive trade policymakers seem intent on making the competitive BDCs accept a more
mature role in the world trading system. Abandoning reliance
upon preferential tariff schemes is an important first step. Graduation concepts in the 1984 Act also emphasize that the GSP was
originally intended to be both temporary and conditional upon
demonstrated foreign need and domestic discretion.
The second general trend is the recognition that the BDC criteria in the 1984 Act should reflect greater political emphasis on
secondary-level trade concerns. Earlier GSP legislation contained
BDC criteria reflecting historical first-level trade concerns, such
as national security, anti-Communism, and required participation
in multilateral negotiating forums.23 7 Because the GSP program
as it existed prior to 1984 already dealt adequately with most
first-level trade concerns, Congress decided to address the next
level-foremost of which is the use of subtle trade barriers not
specifically governed by the multilateral rules on tariffs. By its
requirement of specific standards with regard to worker rights,
prohibition of NTBs, barriers to trade in services, and abuses of
intellectual property rights, Congress has signaled that it is ready
to act on secondary-level trade concerns. 23 8 These concerns are
now of primary importance to the United States and take precedence over concerted future efforts to procure multilateral agree-

235.
236.
237.
238.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
supra note 173 and accompanying text.
supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
supra notes 136-70 and accompanying text.
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ment on the reduction of trade barriers within the GATT forum.
Despite congressional desire to influence the future course of
multilateral negotiations, a more vexing question with regard to
the 1984 changes is over the practical extent to which these secondary-level concerns can be incorporated into the United States
GSP scheme. The answer to this question depends upon the ability of the executive branch to formulate procedural changes necessary to implement congressional policy. Therefore, the third
trend is the growing importance of the work of statisticians, bureaucrats, and planners necessary to transform the vague congressional directives into a clear and effective tariff incentive
program.
The fourth and final trend is the more active congressional role
in the operations of the GSP program. Increasing volumes of GSP
trade, rising concern for the protection of domestic producers, increasing BDC dependence upon GSP trade, and documented inadequacies of the program have attracted congressional attention.
Many 1984 Act changes also reflect Congress' desire to dictate,
restrict, or remove executive branch authority over the operations
of certain aspects of the GSP. The 1984 Act also evidences congressional desire for more opportunity to oversee the program's
operation through a General Review, periodic reports, and more
public hearings.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although Congress curbed executive discretion in some areas,
the major responsibility for GSP operation and decisionmaking
remains with the President through the GSP Subcommittee at
the USTR. In most instances the 1984 Act provides only general
guidelines. The executive branch will have to formulate specific
procedures and possibly expand its staff to accommodate the
growing administrative, regulatory, and monitoring responsibilities. The GSP Subcommittee will need to rely, even more than at
present, upon the private sector to participate in the GSP program and to help monitor such problems as BDC uses of NTBs
and abuses of intellectual property and worker rights. Thus, it is
increasingly important that the private sector understand the
GSP problems at issue as well as the regulations and procedures
of the program. The new BDC criteria will be of little practical
significance unless the USTR develops detailed regulations and
announces specific plans for implementing the 1984 Act changes.
The future of the United States GSP will reflect the interrela-
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tionship of the program's major goals. GSP benefits will continue
until at least 1993 under the present system of eligibility conditioned upon satisfying specified congressional criteria and increased graduation of competitive products. Extension of the
GSP scheme on a multilateral scale past 1993 most likely will depend upon the economic and political exigencies at that future
date. Certainly, for the United States scheme, any future extension will continue to reflect the identified policy goals and trends.
Complete country graduation is now statutorily possible, but is
not an immediate threat. The new BDC criteria are currently
more valuable as political statements than as guidelines for practical action. The BDC criteria will become useful only after further clarification of regulations, standards, and procedures and
after greater multilateral cooperation, consensus, and compliance.
For now, Congress is apparently content to demonstrate its desire
to use the GSP as a political sounding board with the hopes of
prompting action on leading matters of trade concern.
Frank A. Hirsch, Jr.

676

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18.625

APPENDIX
TABLE 1
BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES IN THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES
Independent Countries
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Kiri ati
Korea, Republic of
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Nauru
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru

Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Burma
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African
Republic
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Fiji
Gambia, The
Ghana
Grenada
Guatemala

Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syria
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Tuvalu
Uganda
Upper Volta
Uruguay
Vanatu
Venezuela
Western Samoa
Yemen (Sanai)
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Non-Independent Countries and Territories
Bermuda
British Indian Ocean
Territory
Cayman Islands
Christmas Island
(Australia)
Cocos (Keeling) Islands
Cook Islands
Falkland Islands (Islas
Malvinas)
French Polynesia
Source:

Gibraltar
Heard Island and
McDonald Islands
Hong Kong
Macau
Montserrat
Netherlands Antilles

New Caledonia
Niue
Norfolk Island
Pitcairn Islands
Saint Christopher-Nevis

Saint Helena
Tokelau
Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands
Turks and Caicos Islands
Virgin Islands, British
Wallis and Futuna
Western Sahara

OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 3 (1984).
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RENEWAL OF THE GSP
TABLE 2

COUNTRmES DESIGNATED As LEAST LESS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY THE UNITED NATIONS

Ethiopia
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti

Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Botswana
Burundi
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoras
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea

Laos
Lesotho

Malawi
Maldives
Mali
Nepal
Niger

Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Upper Volta
Western Somoa
Yemen (PDR)
Yeman (Sanak)

Source: SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, RENEWAL OF THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES,

S. REP. No. 485, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 16 (1984).

TABLE 3
PRODUCT GRADUATION UNDER THE GSP
[In millions]
Year

1980
1981
1982
1983

Discretionary

Competitive

graduation

need
exclusions

$ 443

$ 5,600
6,782
7,108
10,661

651
900
1,211

Total
exclusions

GSP free
imports

$ 6,043
7,433
8,008
11,872

$ 7,328
8,395
8,426
10,765

Ratio
exclusions to
GSP imports

Note: Data shown for graduation and competitive need exclusion pertain to actions
implemented in March of the following year. Source: U.S. TRADE REP.
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TABLE 4
U.S. TOTAL IMPORTS AND GSP IMPORTS IN 1983 FROM LEADING
BENEFICIARY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND 1982 PER CAPITA GNP
[Dollar amounts in millions]
U.S.
imports

GSP
eligible

$11,204

7,148
6,394
16,776
4,946
2,868
1,255
2,001
4,938
853
2,191
386
1,151
967
280

$ 5,757
2,365
3,036
3,859
1,170
1,394
512
386
258
315
227
196
156
142
134

$ 2,981
1,524
1,102
725
633
512
474
258
239
225
181
162
142
118
107

Subtotal of top 15
Other beneficiaries

$63,358
431

$19,907
2,676

$ 9,383
1,382

87.2
12.7

Total beneficiaries

$63,789

$22,583

$10,765

100.0

GSP
I free

Share of
GSP free
total
(percent)

1982 GNP
per capita

15 leading beneficiaries
Taiwan
Korea
Hong Kong
Mexico
Brazil
Singapore
Israel
Philippines
Venezuela
Argentina
India
Yugoslavia
Peru
Thailand
Portugal

$2,640
1,910
5,340
2,270
2,240
5,910
5,090
820
4,140
2,620
260
2,800
1,310
790
2,450
...........
............

Source: HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES RENEWAL AcT OF 1984, HX. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1984
US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5104.

